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Central bankers are currently rethinking the frameworks of monetary policy in light of the extreme 
disruptions and unprecedented policies of the Global Financial Crisis. The paper examines whether a 
rule based approach that incorporates moral considerations beyond economic utilitarianism could 
provide a more fair, effective and stable monetary system.  It demonstrates that criticisms of Fed 
policies raise moral questions that reflect a widely held normative framework in the monetary arena. 
The paper abstracts from the criticisms and elaborates a pluralistic framework based in the work of 
moral philosopher W.D. Ross consisting of the basic duties of non-harm, beneficence, fidelity, justice, 
and reparation.  It outlines a decision system that relies on moral intuition and strict attention to the 
facts to balance competing considerations and derive the duty to be followed in the particular 
circumstance.       
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RÉSUMÉ 
Les banquiers centraux repensent actuellement les cadres de la politique monétaire à la lumière des 
perturbations extrêmes et des politiques sans précédent de la crise financière mondiale. L’article 
examine si une approche fondée sur des règles qui intègre des considérations morales au-delà de 
l'utilitarisme économique pourrait fournir un système monétaire plus juste, efficace et stable. Il 
démontre que les critiques des politiques de la Fed soulèvent des questions morales qui reflètent un 
cadre normatif largement répandu dans le domaine monétaire. L'article résume les critiques et élabore 
un cadre pluraliste basé sur le travail du philosophe moral W.D.Ross, composé des devoirs 
fondamentaux de non-préjudice, de bienfaisance, de fidélité, de justice et de réparation. Il décrit un 
système de décision qui repose sur l'intuition morale et une attention stricte aux faits pour équilibrer 
les considérations alternatives et dériver le devoir à suivre dans les circonstances particulières. 
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A crisis within a crisis has been brewing in the gatherings of central bankers and monetary 
policy mandarins over the past decade. At one level, the deliberations have involved the 
financial and economic crisis and the technical aspects of macroeconomics and monetary 
theory. But on closer analysis, one perceives a deeper crisis within - an economic 
establishment at odds at a theoretical level over what kind of monetary system we want, or 
better said, what kind of thinking is needed to manage the global monetary system in a way 
that is fair and beneficial to all.  
Bringing the deeper crisis to a head were the decisions by the US Federal Reserve under 
Chairman Ben Bernanke to institute a series of unprecedented and unconventional monetary 
policies in response to the great financial crisis, lowering interest rates to zero and buying 
more than four trillions of dollars in US Treasury and Mortgage Securities in policies 
commonly referred to as ZIRP and QE.  Welcomed initially, these policies were soon met by 
allegations of serious adverse effects and heavy criticism from emerging market central 
bankers, from the Bank for International Settlements, and from many in academia. These 
criticisms were essentially a challenge to the basic rationale and methods of the Fed policies.  
The Fed’s response was to dismiss the criticisms and justify the unconventional policies with 
the same formal methodologies and normative presuppositions from which they arose. 
In a speech in September 2010 entitled “Implications of the Financial Crisis for Economics,” 
Bernanke gave an indication he was aware of the challenge to the field raised by the 
financial crisis. “I don’t think the crisis by any means requires us to rethink economics and 
finance from the ground up…”  (Bernanke 2010). Contrary to Bernanke’s dismissal, the 
financial crisis and the Fed policy responses had indeed brought the deeper crisis to the 
surface and raised the question whether economics did indeed require a different way of 
thinking from the ground up. 
The methodologies used by the Fed presume that the monetary system is a technical 
enterprise best understood and managed with the formulae of mathematics and physics.  I lay 
out the case in opposition that monetary policy is by its very nature a moral enterprise. By 
this I mean that moral considerations and normative judgements have a great deal to do with 
formulating monetary policy and in deciding what purposes it should serve. The challenge in 
rethinking economics has to do with determining how to make moral considerations count. 
As dominant member of the global monetary system,  it is particularly incumbent on the 
Federal Reserve to recognize the moral responsibilities entailed in setting monetary policy. 
Indeed, I would make the claim that the only way the Fed can preserve its role as manager of 
the world’s reserve currency is by adopting a monetary policy decision framework that 
explicitly justifies its policies transparently on the basis of moral presuppositions. In this 
essay I take an initial step in developing a decision framework that would incorporate the 
moral dimensions of a globalized monetary policy.  
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2. BACKGROUND  IN BRIEF: FINANCIAL CRISIS, FED RESPONSES, CRITICISMS 
OF FED POLICIES 
Most people are now familiar with the events and circumstances of the 2007–12 Great 
Financial Crisis: stock market crashes, a 30 percent collapse in US mortgage and housing 
prices, the bankruptcy of a number of leading US financial firms, the implosion and bailout 
of European banks and sovereigns. The economies of the developed world suffered what has 
become known as the Great Recession with negative GDP and high unemployment levels. In 
a series of policy moves, the Fed set about to open credit channels and stimulate economic 
growth and employment in the U.S. and they were largely successful. In the early days of QE 
even critics acknowledged that much of what the Bernanke Fed initially did was exactly 
right, “... In this matter, central bankers are deservedly heroes” (Rajan 2014b, 4).   
However, the effects of the Fed policies were not all positive and soon criticisms emerged 
even from initial supporters. The Fed’s monetary policy actions benefitted the U.S. but 
produced “spillovers” with negative side effects and “unintended consequences” that harmed 
the rest of the world (White 2012). The criticisms raised the moral question of whether the 
Fed was refusing to accept moral accountability for the consequences of its actions.  
Researchers produced papers showing that low US interest rates and QE monetary expansion 
were leading to commodities price spikes and serious speculative demand shocks in the 
EME.
1
 The EME finance ministers and central bankers who generally operate quietly behind 
closed doors began to blame openly the Fed policy and often Chairman Bernanke himself for 
these adverse consequences. One early critic was Guido Mantega, finance minister of Brazil, 
who called out Bernanke at an IMF meeting for undertaking “a selfish policy” and for 
“reignit[ing] the currency wars with potentially drastic consequences for the rest of the 
world”(Zhang 2012). ‘Brazil’s Finance Chief Attacks US over QE’ (Rathbone and Wheatley 
2012).  
Mantega also put forward his complaints in a more official way in the IMF semi-annual 
proceedings.  
Major reserve currency … ultra-expansionary monetary policies [are] the primary 
trigger of many of today’s economic woes. Excessive liquidity contributes to rapid 
credit expansion and asset price booms, as well as oil and other commodity price 
bubbles increase the cost of living, especially for the poorest (Mantega 2011, 1).  
In addition to Mantega, there were many critics of Fed policy. “The printing press is turning 
non-stop and flooding the world with dollars” (Mercopress 2011). “.. [T]he Fed’s attempt to 
flood U.S. markets saw large amounts of cash spill over into emerging markets” (Mackintosh 
2013, 11). Food price and currency distortions caused severe hardship in poor countries 
where food is a large percentage of the average household budget (Inman 2011; Melloan 
2011). A former high level UN official summed it up “The Fed’s expansionary monetary 
policy generates significant externalities for the rest of the world—effects that the Fed is 
                                                 
1
See as examples: Krichene (2008); Warnock and Warnock (2009); Neely (2011); Fratzscher, et al 
(2013); Ahmed and Zlate (2013); Rogers et al. (2014); Bowman et al. (2014); Bruno and Shin (2015); 
O Davis (2015). 
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certainly not taking into account” (Ocampo 2012).  These all represent criticisms of the Fed 
based on moral considerations.  
A look at the Fed responses suggests that Fed Chair Ben Bernanke was indeed dismissing the 
various charges and criticisms with little regard for moral responsibilities. Bernanke’s 
position was basically a denial of causation or causal responsibility for EME problems as 
contemporary accounts reflect: “Fed Chief Ben Bernanke Denies U.S. Policy behind Record 
Global Food Prices” (Blackden and Wilson 2011); “Bernanke Defends Fed from Claims It Is 
Being Selfish and Hurting Emerging Economies” (Zhang 2102); “[A]dvanced-economy 
monetary policies are not the dominant [causal] factor behind emerging market capital 
flows” (Bernanke 2012); “the linkage between advanced-economy monetary policies and 
international capital flows is looser than is sometimes asserted” (Bernanke 2012). Bernanke 
also defended unprecedented actions with claims that what he did for the US was actually 
good for the world economy as well. “This policy not only helps strengthen the U.S. 
economic recovery, but by boosting U.S. spending and growth, it has the effect of helping 
support the global economy as well” (Reuters 2012). The Bernanke Fed’s justification was 
“An unconventional monetary policy was necessary to keep the U.S. economy growing and 
effective. In that respect, it is in everyone’s interest to have the U.S. economy growing 
faster” (Anand and Bellman 2014).  
Beyond dismissing the criticisms, Bernanke did not think the Fed was any way responsible 
for helping the EME, “…emerging markets have all the tools they need to address excess 
demand in those countries” (Bernanke 2012).  And the Bloomberg news service  reported 
Bernanke to say, “They [EME] know what to do in a world dominated by the Federal 
Reserve. If they don’t do it the Fed can’t do much about that” (Mckee 2015).  Other 
members of the FOMC agreed putting it this way, “we only have a mandate to concern 
ourselves with the interest of the United States” and, “Other countries simply have to take 
that as a reality” (Kennedy, Zumbrun, Kearns, 2013). 
Another critic of Bernanke’s methods and policies, Raghuram Rajan, challenged Bernanke’s 
dismissive posture. At various times an IMF chief economist, Bank of India Governor,  BIS 
researcher and University of Chicago professor,  Rajan provided a narrative empirical 
account that directly questioned Bernanke’s reliance on methods of modelled abstraction. 
“By downplaying the adverse effects of cross-border monetary transmission of 
unconventional policies, we are overlooking the elephant in the post-crisis room” 
(Rajan 2014a, 6).  
This simple metaphor was essentially a frontal attack on the narrow theory of causation of 
the Fed methodologies that allowed the Fed to hold its cramped theory of moral 
responsibility.  
Rajan also criticized a Fed monetary policy that “moves toward extremely and 
unconventionally accommodative policies” as a “…new, varied form of competitive easing” 
(Rajan 2014c, 2).  In this way Rajan brought to the fore the key point that the Fed’s 
“unconventional” policies had broken with long established standards and rules of expected 
behavior among members of the global monetary system. Rajan called out the Fed’s 
methodology of lumping all countries together in a globally aggregated scorecard dismissing 
negative spillover effects and only taking into account the “net costs” in gauging its 
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successes. (Rajan, 2014b, 7) In an aggregated calculation of total benefits the elephant in the 
room disappears. 
Not surprisingly, Bernanke reacted very strongly to Rajan’s criticisms as the news accounts 
reflect “Banker showdown: Bernanke tells off India’s Rajan” (Caruso-Cabrera. 2014).  
A number of researchers stepped in to counter Bernanke’s denials and disavowals. Most 
prominent was London Business School economist Helene Rey, one of Bernanke’s sharpest 
critics in academia.  Rey showed that the global benefits of Fed policies claimed by 
Bernanke were insubstantial, “the gains tend to be small; …on the order of a few tenths of a 
percent” (Rey 2013,19). Rey also took on Bernanke’s narrow theory of causal responsibility 
showing that the Mundell- Fleming Trilemma “misleads us” by assuming that a country has 
its own monetary policy in the face of Fed actions (Rey, 2014, 2). In a recent update of her 
early work, Rey was more direct, concluding that the Fed is the hegemon and US monetary 
policy the main driver of the global financial system, thus the Fed must take account of the 




In later responses Bernanke singled out Mantega, Rajan and Rey as his primary antagonists. 
(Bernanke 2015a, 52–64; Bernanke 2015b, 23–37). He basically dismissed them all saying 
the Fed was not responsible for the destabilizing effects of its policies and the causation 
relation is weak.
3
   
“The relationship between the global financial cycle and destabilizing financial 
spillovers is a loose one, at best. …there are many reasons for financial conditions to 
be correlated across countries, some of which are more benign” (Bernanke 2015b). 
Bernanke thus denies causation and refutes the Fed’s role in harms and injustices.  When 
there were other actors or intervening events, the Bernanke Fed put the causation and blame 
on them  and assumed no moral responsibility for the consequences of Fed policy action.   
We see normative judgements throughout these criticisms of the Fed. Clearly, the crisis 
related events were seen as moral and not simply economic phenomena. When Mantega 
worries about the small countries unfairly paying a high price and the speculative commodity 
shocks burdening the poorest he is registering moral complaints about the harms caused by 
Fed policies. When Rajan criticizes Fed policies “…where the benefits are largely in the US, 
while the costs fall largely abroad...” he is registering a justice claim. When Rajan describes 
policies as “extreme and unconventional” and “competitive easing” he is complaining that 
                                                 
2
 The BIS researchers support the Rey thesis. For example, see G Plantin and HS Shin,  ‘Exchange 
Rates and Monetary Spillovers’, BIS Working Papers No 537, Bank for International Settlements, 
January 2016.  
3
 Bernanke dismissed the Rey findings on formal methodological grounds - for “lack of global factor 
benchmark”, for failure to consider “long period buildup effects” and also went on to dismiss Rey’s 
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the excess leverage, capital surges and countries awash with dollars are the result of the Fed 
breaking the understood rules of the game. Rajan, Rey and others reflect the view that a high 
standard of moral responsibility is appurtenant to the Fed’s status as hegemon and privileged 
reserve currency role of the US dollar. These criticisms can all be viewed as claims of moral 
norms breached and promises broken. In this essay, I will argue that in forming monetary 
policy the decision makers should take these moral considerations into account ahead of 
time.  This means that a decision framework for the central bank as a moral enterprise must 
incorporate principles like non-harm, beneficence, and justice in its monetary decision 
framework.  
In addition, underlying all the criticism is a constant refrain of the Fed’s inability or refusal 
to take all of the facts and consequences of its actions into account - of a Fed disregarding 
the world around it and lacking information needed to manage the monetary system that it 
dominates. Rajan points to the elephant in the room that the Fed is ignoring. Ocampo speaks 
of the significant ‘externalities’ that the Fed certainly is not taking into account.  Rey 
concludes the Fed is ‘not paying attention’ to the implications of its policies for the rest of 
the world.  The off-hand dismissal of relevant facts by the Fed is in sharp contrast to the Fed 
critics’ insistence on a full account of the situation at hand. This information selectivity or 
modeled abstractification of the facts is a serious deficiency in the Bernanke Fed’s approach 
to policy making.  Since a comprehensive factual account is essential to the resolution of 
moral problems, the Fed needs a better causation theory to support its decision framework. 
After outlining a rule based framework I discuss the broader theories of causation, 
recognition and probability needed for a monetary policy decision framework.  
2.1. A Rule Based Moral Framework 
To consider how moral considerations might be best accommodated in a Fed decision one 
must look closely at what a central bank decision involves. A central bank is not simply a 
financial institution where only economic consequences count. As we saw in the examples 
above, decisions of a monetary authority involve wide political, social and moral questions 
that cannot be properly accounted for if only economic utilitarian thinking is recognized. As 
can be seen in the EME criticisms there are questions of justice and of rules of the game not 
taken into account. One way to include such considerations would be to try to assign a value 
to injustices and harms and make that part of the cost/benefit calculations. But that is 
cumbersome if not impossible and basically concedes the argument for utilitarianism. 
Instead, I describe a duty based approach to monetary policy that includes a duty of welfare 
optimization. Thus, I take seriously the utilitarian perspective that it is already inherent in the 
Fed monetary policy role but in my approach it is only be one moral concern - or one duty - 
among several others. Further, I would go beyond the economic utilitarianism of the Fed and 
use the broader definition of ideal utilitarianism - where the goal is not only  economic 
welfare but in making society and individual lives better off and the world as good a place as 
it can be.  
Given the complexities of monetary policy decisions, I am proposing a pluralistic framework 
for deciding between competing moral duties and utilitarian considerations. It is based on the 
work of mid 20
th
 century Scottish moral philosopher, W.D. Ross, for many years Professor 
and Provost at Oxford University. He was a leading figure in the “intuitionist school” of 
moral theory and the author of still influential works Foundations of Ethics and The Right 
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and the Good. Ross sought to find a common framework for implementing the key insights 
of both the duty-oriented approach associated with Immanuel Kant and the utilitarian 
approaches traced to John Stuart Mill and others. This framework suits the case at hand as 
the critics focus on harms and injustices of Fed policies, reflecting a Kantian perspective 
while on the other hand the Fed relies on the greater good reflecting the Mill utilitarian 
formulations. The Ross “pluralistic” framework thus presents itself as a useful framework for 
accommodating these differences.   
Ross counted himself within the Kantian tradition and emphasized the importance of duties 
and rules that must be observed irrespective of the consequences or utilities to be maximized. 
However, Ross didn’t reject consequentialism out of hand. His concern was that 
utilitarianism often made “consequences” the only consideration in a moral decision, putting 
the production of something in the future the primary focus of the moral task. As Ross puts 
it, this future oriented consequentialist perspective ignores the facts that “stare us in the 
face,” that the morally right thing to do often consists in being faithful to obligations 
established in the past without weighing the costs and benefits of doing so (Ross 1935, 1). 
Nevertheless, though Ross thought that utilitarianism was on its own an inadequate account 
of the morally right thing to do, unlike most orthodox Kantians he provided a framework that 
gave due regard for utilities and consequences as morally significant. Ross develops this 
account by including justice and utility in what he called prima facie duties and relying on 
deep appreciation of the facts and moral intuition to determine the actual duty is to be 
observed in a particular situation. 
3. PRIMA FACIE DUTIES: CONDITIONAL VS. ACTUAL DUTIES 
 
The Ross pluralistic form of intuitionism recognizes there are often multiple duties 
incumbent on the moral agent facing a particular decision. Ross’s list includes a number of 
duties, most of which came up in the criticisms and in Bernanke responses: beneficence, or 
greater good; non-maleficence or harm avoidance; fidelity, or faithfulness to promises made; 
justice, of insuring fairness and equity; and reparation, or redressing previous wrongs (Ross 
1935, 21). Taken together these prima facie duties constitute the “pluralistic” duty 
orientation of the Ross approach. 
Ross makes the strong claim that these duties are self-evidently true and express the moral 
order that is a fundamental element of the universe.  
[A prima facie duty] is self-evident just as a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a 
form of inference, is evident. The moral order expressed in these propositions is just 
as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe … as is the spatial or 
numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. (29, 30) 
In our confidence that these propositions [of prima facie duties] are true there is 
involved the same trust in our reason that is involved in our confidence in 
mathematics; (30) 
Calling moral duties as intuitively self-evident as a mathematical axiom seems a rather large 
claim.  However, there does seem to be a broad intuitive recognition of these moral norms as 
we saw the moral concerns they reflect registered in the complaints of the Fed critics.   
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The idea of prima facie duty and the ‘actual duty’ to which it gives rise is solidly grounded 
in the facts.   
A prima facie duty is something like a “conditional duty” - not yet a duty that is 
required to be performed until all the conditions and circumstances are known. (19) 
The emphasis in Ross then is that although the moral decision involves discerning one’s 
moral duty, it is dependent on a thorough knowledge of the circumstances and a sorting 
through of the facts to determine which obligations call us to action. Once that is done, one 
of the conditional duties emerges (through a mental process described below) as the “duty 
proper” or the “actual duty.” (19, 20) In this emphasis on knowing the facts Ross’s system is 
relentlessly empirical.  
An important insight is carried in the idea of “prima facie” duties. A sense of obligation to 
the other duties remains intact even when one is performing the “actual duty.” Ross thus 
captures something quite important here about moral psychology in complex practical 
circumstances, namely, the awareness that the “duty proper” does not satisfy all moral claims 
and further, that moral agents feel there to be continuing, conflicting duties that have real 
claims on them when they cannot fulfill all duties in a particular circumstance. In Ross’s 
scheme these remain conditional duties that might still become actual duties if the conditions 
and circumstances were to change. The upshot of the Ross approach is that it recognizes the 
importance of the decision maker constantly reevaluating the evolving circumstances to 
determine the “duty proper’ that might emerge as the “greatest duty’ in the changed 
circumstance. This constant reevaluation and reassessment is another indication of the 
relentlessly empirical nature of Ross’s scheme. 
Ross emphasizes that the whole situation must be taken into account before making the 
moral decision.  
The ‘duty proper’ or actual duty which arises from the ‘whole nature of the 
situation’ (Ross, 33). 
The nature of this concern for a full account of the facts and circumstances is echoed in the 
words of a highly regarded late twentieth-century philosopher, William Frankena. 
 …when one is puzzled about what he or someone else should do in a certain 
situation, … most of us would probably be clear about what should be done if only 
we knew all of the relevant facts. … much of our difficulty about decisions of policy 
is due to unclarity. Certainly, a large part of the debate about what to do… arises 
because we are ignorant of much of what bears on these problems (Frankena 1973).  
And for Frankena, like Ross, the effort to try to understand all the relevant facts is absolutely 
critical.  
I stress these points because I think that moral philosophers cannot insist too much 
on the importance of factual knowledge and conceptual clarity for the solution of 
moral and social problems.  
This relentless empiricism and the need to get clear on and attend to all the facts is a subtle 
but extremely important feature of responsible moral decision making. As we saw from the 
complaints against Bernanke, the failure to understand and engage all the facts is a 
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fundamental flaw in the Fed’s simplified decision framework.  
3.1. The whole nature of situation to be understood 
Ross’s emphasis on importance of taking the whole nature of the situation into account is 
illustrated with his example of the isosceles triangle. All isosceles triangles have two equal 
angles. But that feature is only a single attribute of similarity as the triangles may differ 
considerably as to the length of the sides, size of the angles or the total area (Ross, 1935, 33). 
So also with a determination of one’s moral duty proper.  All angles and dimensions of the 
situation must be taken into account. Otherwise, a decision maker could think that he or she 
had fulfilled a moral duty having mistakenly considered only one aspect of the situation. 
Ross realized that even after careful consideration of all the facts, there could still be a 
disagreement over what duty the situation entails. However, forcing a dialogical process 
around the facts is the best way to reach agreement on a way forward. Overly focusing on a 
partial account of the facts – on the prospective consequences of success - is what Ross 
thinks that those who subscribe to utilitarianism do, and what its critics think that the Fed 
does. The key point is that appreciation of the whole nature of a situation is critical and 
achievable only by an insistence on the relentless empirical inquiry described by Ross and 
Frankena.  
In Ross’s frame, the serious criticisms against Bernanke come down to his ignoring the 
important facts of the externalities and spillovers and his consequent failure to address 
important moral considerations. So before discussing duties in more detail, I propose some 
ways to remedy these deficiencies in Bernanke’s processing of relevant facts and 
circumstance. First, I would expand the Fed's narrow and inadequate theory of causation and 
remedy the deficiency in his probability calculus of largely ignoring the odds and costs of 
harms and failures. Second, I would substitute a “thick theory” for Bernanke’s “thin theory” 
of recognition of the conditions and circumstances of others. These adjustments help satisfy 
the ‘whole nature of the situation’ knowledge requirement in determining the Fed’s proper 
moral duty in the circumstance.  
A Broad Theory of Causation
4
 
Knowing the whole nature of the situation and being relentlessly empirical requires the 
adoption of a broad theory of causation. All consequences of one’s initial action, including 
consequences of subsequent actions of others in response, must be considered in the causal 
chain and become the acknowledged causal responsibility of the initial actor. The new 
emphasis in Fed decision-making would be on taking account of all the circumstances, 
conditions and consequences and on accepting responsibility for the full causal chain of 
events. The image of the “accordion effect” was introduced by the late philosopher Joel 
Feinberg, as a way of understanding the difference between narrow and broad theories of 
causation. Under this image, one could view the consequences of a person’s action as being 
“squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched and puffed out”—like the accordion 
(Feinberg 1970, 146). The “puffed out” or “squeezed down” alternatives have to do with the 
place given to intervening acts or events in one’s causation theory. A ‘squeezed down’ or 
narrow theory of causation would have it that intervening actions often negate the causal 
                                                 
4
See Feldmann 2016 for a fuller treatment of causation theory as it relates to monetary policy decision 
making. 
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connections to the initial act. In other words, the intervening actions exculpate and absolve 
the initial actor of responsibility for subsequent actions. In a ‘puffed out’ version of the 
accordion, the initial actor is considered part of the causal chain for all consequences, 
including the consequences of actions taken by subsequent actors in response to the initial 
action. The ‘puffed out’ theory of causation does not negate the intervening acts, meaning 
that the initial actor is not absolved of the consequences of the reactions of other ‘intervening 
actors’ to the initial act. The ‘puffed out’ theory thus includes causal responsibility even for 
indirect consequences and unintended adverse effects. This puffed out version is admittedly 
a broad definition of causation but Fed policy actions that affect the whole world demand 
broad theories of cause and effect. Such situations demand scientific inquiries, where the 
objective is to get to the bottom of exactly what happened and a full and complete account of 
all consequences is needed. In contrast, legal or moral inquiries may have narrower, 
‘squeezed down’ accordion” views of causality where terms like proximate cause and 
unintended consequences might be applied to limit causation inquiries to culpable 
responsibility. This cannot apply to economic inquiries, which by the nature of the 
economics discipline are scientific and thus require full and complete ‘puffed out’ ideas of 
causation.  
One way of understanding Bernanke’s limited viewpoint on the Fed’s causal role in 
spillovers is that his theory of causation confuses the purposes and procedures of legal causal 
inquiries with those of scientific causal inquiries. Indeed if one listens to his responses - 
‘linkages loose, Fed not the dominant cause’ - Bernanke seems to be incorrectly looking at 
the investigation of ‘spillovers’ in the monetary arena not as a scientific inquiry to get to the 
bottom of the problem but rather mainly as an inquiry (or inquest) to establish his moral or 
legal culpability for the negative spillover effects in the EME.  
Bernanke’s adoption of a narrow causation theory does not befit his field of monetary 
economics, in which a puffed out theory is essential. The process for evaluating expected 
utilities in monetary policy should include a careful scientific examination of all 
circumstances and consequences.  
A puffed out theory of causation ultimately depends on a robust account of ‘probable’ 
consequences. The EME criticisms indicated an apparent lack of awareness or understanding 
on the part of the Fed of the adverse effects of Fed unconventional policies. This is simply a 
result of an inadequate attention to the probability of unsuccessful outcomes. This is what 
BIS Research director William White was warning about in his unintended consequences 
critique. (White 2012) The tendency of utilitarian logics to overly focus on the probability of 
successful outcomes was a major concern of the noted economist J.M. Keynes, who actually 
wrote his PhD dissertation on probability theory. Keynes believed actors tended to see the 
preferred and hoped for highly beneficial outcomes as more probable than they were, 
underweighting the probability of failure and the potential costs of adverse consequences. To 
remedy this deficiency Keynes laid out a decision principle he termed “moral risk.” To 
introduce this concept and situate it in Keynes’ larger scheme would take us beyond the 
purposes of this article, so a summary account must suffice.  
Implementing the moral risk assessment involves the calculation of what Keynes called the 
“probable value.” It involves a balancing of the probable value of failure against the 
probable value of success. (O’Donnell, 122-127) With a “moral risk” assessment, Keynes 
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showed how a significant potential benefit accompanied by a low probability of success 
and thus highly probable large negative consequences would have a total low “probable 
value.” Despite the significant benefit it would be a less desirable choice for a rational 
agent than an option producing a smaller good that was more probable and had fewer 
potential harms (122,123).  The Keynesian moral risk assessment requires a separate and 
careful assessment of potential harms and seems a proper way to insure that adverse 
effects are properly accounted for.  
It is important to emphasize that this requirement of taking into account all probable 
consequences involves a broadened perspective than normally employed in the accounts of  
quantitative formalist economists who prefer simplification, mathematization and reduced 
form models. But the Fed has the human and intellectual capital to carry this off. 
 Along with the expanded theory of causation and the whole nature of the situation 
knowledge requirement there would also be a ‘thick theory of recognition‘ where the 
essential political, cultural and economic factors of all other members of the monetary 
regime would become internalized and part of the Fed’s decision apparatus.  
A Thick Theory of Recognition
5
  
Another problem with Bernanke’s dismissal of critics and refusal to process the relevant 
facts they present lies in an inadequate understanding of the role of the Fed in maintaining 
stability in the international monetary arena. Recognition theory is a staple of international 
relations that sets forth principles for governing state interactions so as to avoid destructive 
competitive behavior and conflict among countries. Under recognition theory the Fed as the 
dominant actor in the global monetary system - US dollar is the reserve currency and Fed 
policy actions are the driver of global financial cycles – would be responsible for adopting  a 
‘thick theory of recognition.‘ A thick theory would require that the essential cultural, 
political and economic factors of all other members of a regime – how each society and 
economy is bound together - should be well understood by the dominant actor if conflicts are 
to be avoided (Allan and Keller 2007).   
The distinction between a thin and thick recognition is an important one for understanding 
the disagreement discussed above between Bernanke and his critics (Allan and Keller 2007, 
72ff). A thin theory is approximately the perspective of the Fed in the current monetary 
system. The other members of the monetary regime are minimally recognized by the Fed as 
independent, autonomous participants, expected to look out for themselves and thus 
minimally represented deterministically and reductionistically in Fed models. There appears 
no attempt on the part of the Fed to recognize the essential particularities of other members – 
or the potential differential effects of policy actions.  
The thin recognition of Bernanke’s aggregative calculation, which rests on the fact that EME 
aggregate GDP growth had increased, would give no indication of the harmful effects that 
were being produced in individual countries and subgroups in the EME by Fed monetary 
policy. A lack of detailed information and misleading conceptualizations facilitates a 
mistaken view of one’s moral duty in the policy process. A thick theory of recognition of the 
‘other’ facilitates a clear view of how doing one’s duty opens the opportunity for coordinated 
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optimal outcomes.  
A fundamental tenet of recognition theory is that the dominant party must go farther than 
merely acknowledging the existence of others. In order to maintain its legitimacy a dominant 
policy actor must have a thick understanding of the other member countries in terms of their 
cultural, political and economic essentials so that ‘red lines’ would not be crossed and 
essentials of fellow actors would not be threatened (Allan and Keller 2007, 77). A thick 
theory of recognition helps avoid missing the elephant in the room and the potential threats, 
harms, and difficulties created by the dominant policymaker can be empathetically taken into 
account.  
The knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, of the whole nature of the situation of the 
probable values and thick theory– are necessary prerequisites to applying the prima facie 
duties. 
3.2. Five Prima Facie Duties  
We return to Ross’s concept of prima facie duties with the purpose of modifying and 
tailoring  Ross’s framework for use in Fed monetary policy decisions.  
As Ross has it, the duties break down between two sets of special relations. One set of 
“special relations” is understood by looking at institutional context and past actions in order 
to understand those special obligations. A second set of special relations is understood by 
looking outward to the future and the world at large to see what is morally expected (Ross 
1935, 21). 
The defining moral perspective inherent in all moral systems is a strict attention to the 
“other” as captured in the formulation “other regardingness” (Little and Twiss, 1978). The 
special relations construct of Ross seeks to bring all of the ‘others’ affected by the moral 
decision whether near or far, past or future, into the immediate presence of the decision 
maker. The duties and obligations to past, present, and future constituencies can be 
simultaneously lined side by side, so to speak, so that no “other” is left out.  Constituencies 
far removed in time or space (and elephants in the room) cannot then be overlooked and 
ignored.  
This special relations concept is designed to neutralize the utilitarian tendency to look 
outward to 'hoped for' future consequences in an effort to produce an optimal future result. In 
looking to the future, the utilitarians tend to ignore other important relations and obligations 
arising from past actions. Ross wanted to make sure that the past facing inquiry received due 
attention. “When [one] fulfils a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, … He thinks in 
fact much more of the past than of the future” (Ross 1935,17). One shouldn’t look only at 
potential benefits, one must keep faithful to one’s promises and agreements.  This is relevant 
to Fed considerations because taking unprecedented policy actions constitutes a breach of an 
understanding and implicit agreement among and between the parties in the monetary arena. 
This is precisely what Bernanke is accused of when lack of respect for reserve currency 
obligations and extreme and unconventional actions are complained of. 
As mentioned, Ross used familiar terms for these special duty relations. In adapting the Ross 
special relations scheme to the Fed context, I propose the following duties for use by policy 
decision makers. Looking to the past, the duty of fidelity would focus on the obligations and 
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promises that arose out of prior actions of the Fed, on its purposes, traditions, patterns of 
practice and promises. The duty of reparation would require repairing and remediating the 
harms caused by what were later discovered to be wrongful past actions of the institution.  
The prima facie duties formed by looking outward and to the future rest on a general 
appraisal of the future condition of humankind. These are beneficence, justice and non-harm. 
The duty of beneficence focuses on improving lives in the future and obligates policy makers 
to produce outcomes that benefit humankind and make things better for all. The prima facie 
duty of justice involves maintaining a proper distribution of opportunities, benefits and 
burdens in accordance with standards of fairness and equity. The third type of forward-
looking duty is that of avoiding any act that causes harm or injury to others. Ross referred to 
this as prima facie duty of non-maleficence – or simply non-harm. These duties comport 
with our common sense, moral intuitions and fit with the claim of Ross and others that 
propositions like these are self-evident and a fundamental part of the moral universe. This 
viewpoint of universal moral norms has its disclaimants but as we saw in the various 
criticisms from many countries and cultures these duties and underlying principles seem to 
be the undergirding norms of the monetary community.  
As indicated, we will discuss these prima facie duties in terms of Fed policy making in the 
circumstances surrounding the financial and global economic crisis of 2007-2012. The 
objective is not to define the duties in detail but merely to give tangible examples of the 
decision framework in action and then sketch out arguments as to how the duties could be 
carefully considered by the Fed as a part of each monetary policy decision.  
Ross considered non-harm the most important of the duties, so we shall discuss it first.  
3.3. The Prima Facie duty of Non-harm  
Ross put non-harm in a special category as a duty “of a more stringent character” (Ross 
1935, 21). It might seem that harm avoidance would be implicit in the duty of beneficence or 
greater good. Ross said as much himself. “No doubt to injure others is incidentally to fail to 
do them good – and should be part of the beneficence calculus” (21).  However, Ross still 
has it that non-harm should be viewed as a distinct duty because “... it seems to me clear that 
non-maleficence is apprehended as a duty distinct from that of beneficence, and as a duty of 
a more stringent character” (21). Ross recognizes here that if included with beneficence the 
prospect of failed policy and harms caused can too easily be overlooked or given minimal 
weight in utilitarian cost/ benefit calculations. 
Ross is realistic in recognizing that persons suffer adversely even when the attempt is being 
made to do the right thing. “[T]he probability is that any act, however right it may be, will 
have adverse effects … on some innocent people” (34). So the “stringent” view of harms as a 
separate and distinct duty is a necessary response to the EME critics who see the Fed as 
ignoring harms entirely or dismissing harmful policies  as “net/net” beneficial overall.    
Attempting to observe a duty of non-harm is a particular challenge for institutions like the 
Fed as their acts have many wide and disparate effects. So given a probability that some 
being harmed is seemingly unavoidable, a reasonable approach to follow would be for the 
policy maker to determine which group of persons can least endure and thus deserve priority 
attention under the prima facie duty of non-harm. Under the non-harm principle, one  group 
needing  special protection, it would seem, would be the persons who are most vulnerable 
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and at greatest risk in being further harmed. As Fed critic Guido Mantega of Brazil pointed 
out, it is often the poorest who were hurt the most in the spillovers from QE.  
I propose then that the duty of non-harm must first and foremost be strictly observed where 
situations of “radical inequality” exist. This category was developed by two political 
philosophers, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Pogge.  (Nagel 1977; Pogge 2005) The “radically 
unequal” by their account are individuals and groups living at the margins of society who are 
not only far worse off than those around them but often only barely surviving - in a state of 
permanent jeopardy. The least disruption in the economic order, such as a shock to the 
monetary system causing food prices to rise or essential goods to become unavailable, could 
be potentially life threatening.  
Nagel characterized the condition of the worst off in terms of a “radical inequality” in the 
following way. The radically unequal are very badly off in absolute and relative terms--very 
much worse off than others. This radical inequality is pervasive and involves all aspects of 
life; and is impervious as most of the better-off have no real idea of what it is like to live in 
that way. Importantly, this inequality is avoidable, meaning that the better off are capable of 
improving the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming badly off themselves (Nagel 
1977). 
Given the criterion “badly off in absolute terms and in relative terms,” Pogge suggests that 
the condition of radical inequality would inarguably apply to those who entirely lack the 
basic amenities of food, clean water, health care etc. And he cites World Bank studies that 
specifically identify this group. The last criterion of the radically unequal, that the better off 
must be fully capable of improving the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming 
badly off themselves, seems fully realizable given the disparity between $1-$2 for the worse-
off and $75 per day at the top (Pogge 2005, 29).
6
  
Furthermore, the principle of non-harm would put these radically unequal ahead of those for 
whom one is most responsible in normal circumstances. For example, the Fed would have to 
measure the harms to the poorest worldwide as it decided what level of unemployment level 
in the US is acceptable when continuing the policies pushing for lower levels of 
unemployment might cause serious, even life threatening, harms to the radically unequal.  
Another point to consider in according special protection to the radically unequal is that the 
numbers of the world’s poor described as “radically unequal” under this framework are 
evidently not a part of the upside of the global economy and are likely to receive little if any 
benefits from Fed policies designed to grow the global economy. Yet, they seemingly are 
most likely to be harmed disproportionately on the downside, such as Mantega’s IMF 
testimony suggests.  
Much more could be said in filling out each of the conditions of radical inequality and giving 
specific examples, but this seems sufficient for our purposes of introducing a Fed duty of 
non-harm.  
3.4. Duty of Beneficence – the Greater Good - Making things better for all  
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The prima facie duty of beneficence would encompass the Fed’s economic utilitarian goal of 
maximizing economic welfare as indicated in Bernanke’s own words.  
“… there is a greater good here which is the health and recovery of the U.S. 
economy. And for that purpose we have been keeping monetary policy conditions 
accommodated and trying to support recovery…”(Bernanke 2012).  
“This policy not only helps strengthen the U.S. economic recovery, but by boosting 
U.S. spending and growth, it has the effect of helping support the global economy as 
well.” (Reuters 2012)  
The Fed monetary policy actions already observe this duty when they seek to achieve the 
greater economic good. Thus, the prima facie duty of beneficence is clearly the most natural 
and comfortable duty for the Fed as an economic institution to fulfill. However, there are a 
couple critical points to make.  
The first point has to do with the need to examine Bernanke’s claim that ensuring the 
recovery of the US economy automatically means a benefit to the global economy. Whether 
the Fed actually promoted global economic welfare and fulfilled its duty of beneficence in 
the financial crisis as it claimed is not clear on the evidence. The US GDP recovered from -
3.8% in 2009 to 1.9% in 2010 and to roughly 3% in 2019. The global economy also 
registered growth GDP rising from -.7% in 2009 to 4.9% in 2010 and now at the 3.5% range 
in 2019. These GDP results would suggest that against its own standards the Fed has met its 
duty of improving economic welfare. Even outspoken critics of the Fed agreed that despite 
the risks and harms, the initial Fed policy actions were initially needed and fully justified 
(Rajan 2014a). Based on the evidence post financial crisis it could be argued that the Fed did 
meet its obligations under the duty of beneficence. 
However, despite benefits to the global economy in the aggregate, not everyone was 
benefitting. We have already seen that in the period soon after the initiation of ZIRP and 
QE1, there immediately began to emerge evidence of the adverse effects in the EME of U.S. 
monetary policy.  The studies showed that the policy benefits to the US were provided at the 
expense of causing harm to a great many people. Prices of necessity commodities rose 
precipitously. The cereal import bill of the periphery eighty-two lowest-income countries 
doubled between 2006 and 2008 (McCalla 2008, 1). Subsequent research confirmed the 
linkage of effects in the EME to the unprecedented Fed policies.
7
 This research also showed 
that the Fed policies were only providing a few tenths of percent in GDP to the global 
economy, so there was no great support to the global economy as claimed by Bernanke 
(Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2018). So there are legitimate questions whether Fed actions in 
the financial crisis did measure up even in fulfilling the duty of beneficence and promoting 
the global economic welfare over the longer term. In retrospect, the US-centric perspective 
and the focus on aggregate measures blind the Fed to the fact that it fell short in promoting 
the greater good in global terms. The point underscored by the Ross framework is that 
although a case were made that the policies of ZIRP and QE1 were initially the right thing to 
do under a duty of beneficence, as US and global economic conditions improved, the duty of 
beneficence itself was no longer the “duty proper.” The circumstances and conditions 
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required a reassessment and a consideration of other duties such as the duties of justice, non-
harm or reparation. 
The second critical point is the need for expanding the definition of the greater good. 
Bernanke speaks of a “greater good” but immediately defines it solely in terms of economic 
goods and the economy. At present economic welfare is measured by Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and used by the central banks, with the aggregative growth of GDP in goods 
and services being the specific way that the Fed defines greater good. But aggregative 
economic welfare is not necessarily the best way of defining the greater good and overall 
betterment of mankind. For example, the conversations around the idea of maximizing 
human capabilities proposed by Amartya Sen represent an alternative strain of thinking 
about human welfare goals (Sen 1987). There is also the concept of “ideal” utilitarianism 
where the good to be maximized could be defined even more broadly in non-hedonistic 
terms, such as improving cultural and aesthetic experiences and societal relationships. The 
overall important point is that in defining the prima facie duty of beneficence thought must 
be given to how it might be measured differently by the Fed in order to achieve betterment of 
mankind and greater good goals. The need for a new definition to partially replace or 
supplement GDP in monetary policy discussions deserves immediate attention, especially as 
the goal of continued maximum economic growth clashes with the climate science findings 
of significant damage to the planet if global growth proceeds at the current pace.   
3.5. Fidelity - Respect for Institutional Purpose, Practices and Traditions 
The prima facie duty of fidelity consists of remaining faithful to the institutional purposes as 
reflected in the charter and history of the Fed and to its established special relationship in a 
global monetary system that is based on the US dollar. The Fed has claimed it is not central 
banker to the world. However, critics maintain that as dominant actor in the monetary arena 
and manager of the global reserve currency that its institutional responsibility should extend 
to all holders of the US dollar.  
The duty of institutional fidelity is an expression of the critical role that  central bank plays 
as a constraint on its government’s potential abuse of the power that goes along with power 
to create money (Dunn 2000, 261). This original purpose and traditional role of a central 
bank is the protection of the currency value (Finkelstein 2009, 150). For the Fed as manager 
of  the dominant reserve currency, the duty of fidelity to preserve currency value extends to 
all who hold the Fed’s promissory notes.  
The Fed’s duty of fidelity is in large part based in its global hegemonic role and its position 
as steward of the dominant reserve currency for the global economy. With the dollar 
representing 65% of world reserves (US Treasury Direct, IMF COFER) and 90% of global 
financial transactions amounting to $3 quadrillion per year (BIS 2015), the Fed’s policies 
govern economic activities not only of the U.S. but also of the entire global economy.  
The nub of the critics’ arguments is as follows. This currency relationship between the Fed 
and all holders of the US dollar gives rise to a contractarian obligation that the Fed should be 
faithful to its principles for all those who hold the currency. The US dollar is a Federal 
Reserve Note, in itself a binding promissory note, a contract of indebtedness between the 
Fed and the note holder that should be seen as a strict obligation. The obligations of fidelity 
and trust in its currency fall heavily on the Fed because the US dollar is accorded a 
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‘privileged’ place in the monetary system. Research has shown reserve currency status 
conveys numerous benefits - seigniorage revenue, safe haven status and settlement of major 
global commodity and commercial transactions - thus ensuring a high demand for US dollars 
and enabling the United States to fund its activities readily and cheaply
 
 (Dobbs et al. 2009). 
These analyses point to the substantial benefits of the reserve currency privilege that the US  
enjoys are a result of having the peoples of the world confident in holding its fiat currency. 
This exorbitant privilege arguably entails an equally outsized moral duty of fidelity.  
As dominant actor the Fed sets the rules of the game and the other members of the monetary 
system must organize their economic affairs accordingly in reliance on the Fed’s constancy 
and faithfulness to those rules. The Fed’s dominant position and principled stand against 
beggar they neighbor policies represent implied promises of the Federal Reserve to the 
members of the global monetary system. The Fed had never before experimented with zero 
interest rates and trillions in quantitative easing and when they did so unexpectedly this had 
capital surge and spillover effects that caused much turmoil in the EME. Thus when Rajan 
criticized a Fed monetary policy that “moves toward extremely and unconventionally 
accommodative policies” (Rajan 2014c, 2), he was bringing to the fore the fact that 
understood conventions - or ‘precedental rules’ - had been broken. Viewed against a duty of 
fidelity, this is a charge of institutional infidelity and breach of trust. 
Basically, the institutional duty of fidelity of the Federal Reserve, then, is to eschew any 
abuse of the ability to issue notes at will and depreciate the currency. The Fed critic’s 
complaint that the effects of QE and ZIRP in excess dollar liquidity and capital surges were 
tantamount to a claim that the Fed was in effect creating currency at will. The initial result 
was a depreciated US dollar and corresponding appreciation in the EME currencies with the 
resulting asset booms and commodity price shocks, which looked and felt like the Fed was 
breaching its promise of stable currency values.   
Recalling that Bernanke thought the other countries had to look out for themselves and the 
critics saying that the Fed was not paying attention, a claim that these policies were 
implemented with insufficient regard for the other members of the global monetary system to 
whom it owed a duty of fidelity seems warranted.   
Bernanke defended these extreme and unprecedented actions with claims that he was 
honoring the higher duty of beneficence that what he did for the US was actually good for 
the EME as well.  “An unconventional monetary … it’s in everyone’s interest to have the 
U.S. economy growing faster” (Anand and Bellman 2014). But we have already seen that 
Helene Rey examined this claim and found only a small benefit to the global economy. Thus 
it is questionable whether the continuation of the unconventional policies can be defended 
against charge of breach of trust or privilege on the basis of fulfilling its duty of beneficence.  
This expectation of adherence to a broader duty of fidelity and the implicit promise of a 
reserve currency bank to those in the global monetary regime who hold its currency can be 
heard in the references to reserve currency status of the Fed critics such as Guido Mantega, 
Jose Ocampo, R. Rajan and Helene Rey. The essential point is that the US dollar and the 
Fed, as the “centre bank,” are basically in control of global monetary system and must take 
all countries into account in setting monetary policy (Rey 2013). When that currency is the 
reserve currency of the global economy, the duty of institutional faithfulness extends to the 
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world at large, binding the global monetary regime and economy together. A steady 
faithfulness to the new rules of the game that take these moral duties into account would 
have an important benefit for the world. It nurtures the mutual understandings and trust 
needed for a cooperative approach to central banking that would lead to a more stable and 
fair global monetary system.   
Observing this duty of fidelity has its rewards. The willingness to hold the US dollar that has 
been generated was hard earned through a recognition of its moral responsibility. A 
continuing commitment on the part of the Fed to honor this duty and take into account the 
full consequences of its monetary policies is essential to maintaining that trust.  
3.6. Justice 
Justice may seem an unusual duty to propose for a central bank.  However, the commentary 
from Fed critics consistently refers to implicit standards of justice that the members of the 
monetary system expect the Fed to adhere to. Rajan’s criticism of Fed policies “… where the 
benefits are largely domestic, while the costs fall largely abroad,…”  is fundamentally a 
claim based on norms of distributive justice. He and others are simply saying it is unjust for 
the US to get the benefits and the rest of the world, especially the periphery EME countries, 
to bear the burdens. There is thus a strong justice component throughout the Mantega, Rey 
and Rajan critiques.  
The critics are in essence attempting to force into Fed deliberations the larger distributive 
justice questions of how much and which “others” from the ‘rest of the world’ should count 
in a Fed monetary policy decision. To paraphrase their challenge, they are asking the 
fundamental questions whether a single country’s (US) domestic interests or a single 
measure of greater good (GDP) can any longer be a morally acceptable priority in a 
globalized economy. GDP growth, inexpensive housing finance and low unemployment 
levels of the U.S. or even providing for the general aggregated good of the global economy 
are no longer justified as the actual duty of beneficence without taking the duty of justice 
into account. As the Fed operates in an increasingly globalized world, the duty of justice will 
present its deepest moral challenge in setting monetary policy. 
Within the debate whether justice is a duty applicable to a national institution like the Fed, 
there has been a fundamental debate among theorists over whether an amorphous concept 
like global economic justice is even a viable standard. The debate is between the two basic 
schools of thought on justice in the international realm, the “statists” who say there can be no 
global justice standard and the “cosmopolitans” who say justice is a universal norm and 
applies across borders. 
The Bernanke Fed in proclaiming that the Fed is not central banker to the world and that the 
US economy and citizens of the US are its only constituency has essentially adopted the 
‘statist’ position. The critics of the Fed in pointing to spillovers and unfair burdens are 
essentially saying that the “cosmopolitan” notion of justice is applicable in monetary system 
matters. They are implicitly asserting that global economic justice is a universal binding 
moral standard on central banks, especially the Fed, irrespective of institutional jurisdiction 
or geographic boundaries (Beitz 2005, 17). I would argue that the cosmopolitan account is 
the appropriate standard for a duty of justice in our proposed framework for central bank 
decision making in a globalized economy. 
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It might be noted that some Fed officials have already conceded that the Fed has some 
responsibilities across geographic boundaries, a cosmopolitan view of sorts. For example, 
there is was the statement in the era of the QE by Stanley Fischer, a recent Vice Chairman of 
the Fed.  “In a progressively integrating world economy and financial system, a central bank 
cannot ignore developments beyond its country’s border, and the Fed is no exception” 
(Fischer, 2014). Whether this is a view that will take hold in the future might be seen in the 
Fed actions in the next global recession or crisis. 
So how might the Fed factor into its policy deliberations the merits of global equity and 
fairness claims? As Ross has it, the duty of justice simply requires  that the benefits must be 
distributed fairly and that no constituency should be made to suffer more than its fair share 
of the burdens (Ross 1935, 19, 26).  It is a tall order to evaluate the claims of a multiplicity 
of differently situated parties in a system as complex as the global monetary regime. So for 
the proposed Fed moral decision framework, the duty of justice must be somewhat limited in 
scope.  I put the initial focus of monetary policy on making sure that at a minimum the 
relatively less well-off members of the global economy do not suffer an undue share of the 
burdens and thus are not made worse off in policy changes. And if their lot could be 
improved by policies that would be the preferable outcome. The idea is that there would be 
an overall symmetry to the framework, the duty of non-harm would protect the ‘radically 
unequal’ and the duty of justice would focus on the next tier up - the less well-off. This duty 
of justice thus would operate as a supplement and complement to the duty of non-harm.  
As a way of thinking about how to target the less well-off I would propose the moral 
perspective and decision framework reflected in John Rawls’s concepts of the “difference 
principle” and the “maximin” (Rawls, 2001, 42, 43; Rawls 1971, 60-78) These concepts 
would be the basis of general axioms applied by a central bank in taking account of justice 
claims that range across geopolitical boundaries and constituencies but not within a state 
where the legislative mandates would apply.  
The “difference principle” that I propose drawing on Rawls would stand for the proposition 
that contemplated policy actions unduly favoring the better off would need to be adjusted 
until the proposed policy provides a proportionately greater benefit to the less well-off 
members of the global economy. My proposed version of Rawls’s idea of the ‘maximin’ 
would take the general idea of the difference principle a step further in watching out for the 
less advantaged.  Maximin would have it that the duty of justice  would promote where 
possible the well-being of those who are relatively less well off  toward making their 
prospects as great as they can be (Rawls 2001, 97-98; Rawls 1971, 152ff). These conceptions 
of the difference principle and maximin introduce the proper moral perspective for an 
institution like the Fed with a global constituency. They are proposed in the context of a 
cosmopolitan theory of justice designed to take the whole world into account in determining 
who is to be made better off and who is to be made worse off.   
There may be questions from some about simply importing Rawlsian ‘statist’ principles 
developed for a specific polity and national governance structure into a global justice 
context. However, I would defend this application of Rawls and respond this way.  First, the 
monetary system is essentially a global polity structure with a governance system of its own 
that plausibly meets statist criteria (Feldmann 2014). Second, Rawls’s stipulated limits on 
application within a state polity don’t have to be honored as I am not citing him as an 
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authority in backing this idea. These concepts are intuitive and common sense notions of 
justice that are easily adapted to wider settings, including the international monetary arena.  
They basically enunciate the principle that when allocating benefits and burdens, as a general 
matter policy officials should seek to redress existing social and economic inequalities. The 
general ideas behind these justice principles derived from Rawls are useful in the political 
economic realm of central banking where claims are often advanced on the basis of 
economic merit, desert or productive result and some rebalancing with justice and fairness 
criteria is needed .  
For an economic policy institution, this duty of justice of the monetary authority operates at 
two levels–the country level and the individual level. So far we have discussed these duties 
of justice in terms of an aggregated country level, which is how monetary policy decision 
makers tend to look at the world. The comparison between worse off and better off is often 
seen to be between advanced and developing countries in the aggregate. For example, the 
average food budget for a household in a typical developing country is cited as 20% of 
household income, whereas it is only 8% in the advanced country.  
However this aggregated perspective whereby countries not sub-groups or individuals are the 
focus still overlooks even deeper justice issues. The food budget as a per cent of income in 
the worse off in the developing countries is considerably higher than 20% -more like 50% to 
60% for the lower quintiles. For the Indian agricultural laborers who comprise over half the 
country’s population, for example, the food budget is 67% of annual income (Dasgupta et al. 
201, 14). For this group in India and other EME countries the food price shock produced by 
the QE and ZIRP policies was devastating. This gives some idea of the reason that a 
commodity food price shock on the poorest was of such great concern to critics like the 
Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega.  The duty of justice takes on a greater urgency 
when taking a sub country point of view where the true plight of the less well-off is taken 
properly into account. 
In the final analysis, individuals must be considered the ultimate constituents of the global 
institutions. The appeal and importance of focusing on the individual lies in the hard to 
dispute moral intuition that each individual has equal worth or, as Thomas Pogge has put it, 
“that each and every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern” 
(Pogge 2002, 169). It is important to maintain this perspective because counting each person 
avoids calculations like “net benefits exceed net burdens” that economists (and the Fed 
itself) are known to use. This “net benefit” idea deems an action justified, or morally 
acceptable, because the global economy is benefited on an aggregated and “net” basis. 
Vulnerable individuals and sub-groups are, like elephants in the room, too easily overlooked.   
 
3.7. Reparation  
Alongside the duties of non-harm and cosmopolitan justice that would address policies for 
the future, there would be an additional duty focusing on past injustices and harms, the duty 
of reparation. Under Ross’s scheme, the prima facie duty of reparation is to redress wrongs 
and harms that one’s actions have caused in the past (Ross 1935, 21).  This idea of repair I 
propose is not, strictly speaking, a duty of reparation in the Ross sense as it would be 
impossible for the Fed to make up for all damages it may have caused. Under my idea of the 
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duty of reparation, the Fed would have a moral responsibility to cease and where possible 
reverse monetary past policy actions that were subsequently found to have harmful or unjust 
consequences. The duty of reparation that I propose would thus include but go further than 
what Thomas Pogge has referred to as an intermediate duty of justice, “to avert harms that 
one’s past conduct may cause in the future” (Pogge 2005, 134). I would also propose using 
policy making opportunities to construct policies that would help remediate the harmful 
effects of past policy actions. 
Although the limited concept I propose would not entail a positive duty to redress all harms 
and injustices caused in the past, that doesn’t mean an institution shouldn’t be expected for 
moral reasons to do whatever it can to recognize previous harms and not only avoid these in 
the future but, as the opportunity arises, do what it could to repair the damage. Under this 
idea of reparation, the Fed should actively seek to identify and acknowledge harms of past 
policies employing puffed out causation theories and take special care in ceasing and 
reversing harmful policies. The Fed should not be denying responsibility and overlooking the 
elephant in the room as critics have complained.  
Drawing from the criticisms of the Fed, I offer the five prima facie duties or rule-based 
decision principles: non-harm, fidelity, beneficence, justice, and reparation. The duty of non-
harm would protect individuals that exist at the margins. The duty of fidelity would respect 
institutional purposes and rules of expected behavior.  The duty of beneficence would focus 
on the greater good and bettering the lot of humankind.  The duty of justice would fairly and 
equitably allocate the benefits and burdens of monetary policies. The duty of reparation 
would redress wrongs and reverse harmful effects of past policy actions.   
With a relentlessly empirical, pluralistic Kantian/consequentialist system in light of the 
prima facie duties, the major challenge for the decision-maker is then to apply the framework 
and sift the facts carefully to see which one emerges as the “actual duty”, the “duty proper”, 
or what Ross also called “greatest duty” in the particular circumstance.  
4. CHALLENGES IN APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: A PROCEDURE FOR DECIDING AMONG 
COMPETING DUTIES  
The decision process I describe may seem imprecise and wooly headed if compared to the 
apparent precision of the simplified, modeled world of filtered data and elegant mathematical 
formulae that contemporary economists prefer to deal in. But in the formalist decision 
procedures, there is no place for the complexities of the ‘whole nature of the situation’ of the 
world we live in. We have only a calculated reality that only holds as long as the artificial 
conditions of the modeled world can be sustainably imposed. So Ross’ s insistence that a 
complex theory that fits the facts is better than one that is simple is a practical real world 
approach for the Fed despite any apparent imprecision.     
If Ross’s system is to be viable in practical policy-making, the decision maker must 
understand the intuition-based process by which the duty proper is discerned. As Ross 
carefully put it, the decision or act ‘arises from but is not grounded in the facts’ (Ross 1935). 
The action is grounded in the self-evident prima facie duties. This seems a fine distinction 
but on reflection this careful formulation puts an emphasis on the duty to be performed - not 
on the empirical consequences- as the motivation for action. Doing one’s duty is the only 
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morally proper motivation for action according to Ross who follows Kantian thinking 
closely here. This Ross formulation gets away from reliance in utilitarian logics on the facts 
and the conditions of future consequences as the motivations of ones actions and decisions. 
Ross had a lot to say about how one decides among the competing prima facie or conditional 
duties but we can only cover a few concepts here. It is mostly about having confidence in 
one’s intuitional and qualitative judgment faculties to comprehend the fundamental moral 
priorities that arise from the facts. 
The prima facie duties arise by intuition - they are self-evident according to Ross. To repeat, 
because it is important, Ross compared a moral intuition to a mathematical intuition or an 
inference in logic.  
[A prima facie duty] is self-evident just as a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a 
form of inference, is evident. The moral order expressed in these propositions is just 
as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe … as is the spatial or 
numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. In our 
confidence that these propositions [of prima facie duties] are true there is involved 
the same trust in our reason that is involved in our confidence in mathematics… (29-
32) 
Although Ross believed that prima facie duties are self-evidently true and that we can trust 
our reason to tell us so, still the discernment of a particular duty in a particular circumstance 
is not immediately self-evident and requires mental effort and empirical analysis. Ross 
admits that a particular duty is not logically derived from self-evident principles.  
[A] judgment about a particular duty is not a logical conclusion derived from (or 
justified by) self –evident principles.” (31) 
Nor, he admits, is there a definite or overriding general rule for deciding among competing 
prima facie duties.  
 “…there is no definitive principle by which we can draw the conclusion that it is on 
the whole right or on the whole wrong.” (31)  
....For the estimation of the comparative stringency of these prima facie obligations 
no general rules can, so far as I can see, be laid down. (31) 
Although there is not a general rule or definitive principle, the discernment of the “duty 
proper” is still a matter of reliable intuitive judgement according to Ross. It arises not from 
the pure reason but from practical reason involving an assessment of the whole nature of the 
situation and an active insight into the moral order of the universe (34). Ross recognizes that 
practical reason can err in its interpretation of the facts and so he is modest in his claims.  A 
judgment is not necessarily entirely right or “on the whole right,” as Ross puts it. The best 
judgment that the decision maker is able to form is what Ross calls a “considered opinion” or 
what he calls at another point a “probable opinion” of the duty proper (31). (One thinks here 
of Keynes’s emphasis on probability.) A considered opinion is not a “logically justified 
conclusion from general principles recognized as self-evident” (31). It is, rather, “what we 
think is the best we can do” (40) “based on all the evidence available to [us]” (41). The idea 
is that a particular act moves from being merely prima facie duty to being the ‘duty proper’ 
and actually right for that particular circumstance as one has relentlessly examined the facts. 
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But even then it is actually right only in a particular factual configuration and could still 
change over time if the facts change and new information and evidence becomes available.  
Although he lays down no set framework, Ross gives a picture of the mental process that he 
envisions occurring in selecting among conflicting prima facie duties. The decision would be 
a balancing act among competing considerations and duties.   Under Ross’s explanation, the 
moral intuition emerges after looking at the facts and “balancing” the competing duties to 
find the right act, “…[R]ight acts can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being those 
which …… have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness” (Ross, 41). 
Ross also uses other terms like "fitness and correctness" to represent the connection between 
the circumstances and the “right” thing to do.  
 “…common use of the word 'right' naturally conveys … simply the notion of fitness 
or correctness,…” (Ross 1939, 55).  
Ross also uses the idea of suitability to explain rightness and fittingness, saying at another 
point, the right thing to do is that act with “the greatest amount of suitability possible in the 
circumstances” (Ross 1939, 54).  
 At another point, perhaps providing the best insight into his view of the process of careful 
moral discernment, Ross compares moral judgment between prima facie duties to a judgment 
of beauty. Here he invokes the idea of harmony and describes how he thinks the mental 
process of judgment in aesthetics works, calling to mind Kant’s ideas in his Critique of 
Judgment. As Ross puts it: 
There seems to be something not altogether different from the way in which a 
situation calls for a certain act, and the way in which one part of a beautiful whole 
calls for the other parts. …there is a direct harmony between the parts of the 
composition, as there is between a moral situation and the act [duty] which completes 
it (Ross, 1935, 54). 
  
It is in this act of balancing, fitting and harmonizing the facts of a situation to the moral act 
which completes it that the moral order is revealed in a particular situation.  
There is an important shared feature of the concepts of balance, fittingness and harmony. 
They keep both the qualitative and quantitative elements fully and simultaneously engaged 
in the moral decision process. Balance has in one sense a physical and mathematical 
equivalency sort of connotation-–something we set upon a scale or objects held in each hand 
and weighed one against the other. It is also qualitative as when we “balance’ something in 
our minds, we weigh one set of thoughts and considerations against the other. Fittingness 
also has a mathematical sort of geometric connotation; such as the round peg fitting the hole. 
And fit is also a qualitative term and used in aesthetic contexts, such as an object “fitting” 
into the picture. Harmony is also used in both qualitative and quantitative ways. As an 
aesthetic term as Ross uses it here there are qualitative judgments in art and design 
recognizing the harmony in composition as colors and lines. But harmony is also a 
quantitative even mathematical term in the visual arts as the physics of color as well as the 
Golden Ratio of Leonardo Da Vinci or the Hogarth line would indicate.  
As quantitative and qualitative judgments are two distinct and complementary modes of 
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practical reasoning it seems that in his choice of terms of judgment Ross seeks to incorporate 
both modes  of thinking into the moral intuitive judgment process. The categories of balance 
or fittingness are not to be pinned down in a deductive, logically conclusive or quantitatively 
determined mode. However, Ross emphasized that although a judgment is not a logical 
deduction, “[t]his….does not, however, make the doing of our duty a mere matter of chance” 
(31). There is a moral order in the universe in Ross’s Kantian system. The moral order gives 
rise to and is maintained by the observance of the prima facie duties, which Ross avers that 
upon reflection and employment are readily revealed as true and self-evident.  
The decision process I have described may seem at once intricate and imprecise. But I would 
argue that Ross’s conception of an active moral intuition discerning among the prima facie 
duties to express the moral order is an essential complement to economic decision-making in 
institutions like the Fed.  It balances out the mathematical formalism of modern economics 
where the allures of utilitarian logic and illusions of numeral precision dominate a policy 
decision-making approach oblivious to the imbalances and disharmony it may wreak in the 
moral and social order.  
5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
As we live in a time of a mathematical formalism, Ross’s concerns about utilitarian thinking 
and his emphasis on duties like justice and fidelity represent a much needed broadening of 
the moral perspective for policy institutions like the Fed whose decisions have an enormous 
impact on the people of the world.  
There are many features of this adaptation of Ross’s moral decision system that recommend 
it as a policy decision-making framework for the Fed. It takes the whole nature of the 
situation into account with a broad theory of causation, a thick theory of recognition and a 
proper probability analysis of the harms and potential for success. It puts moral 
considerations up front and out in the open and ensures that policy decisions are justified 
against broad justice criteria. The normative preferences of the decision makers are up front 
and explicit and do not remain hidden away in the assumptions and inputs of the econometric 
models. It is moral or “other regarding” in the broadest sense as it brings the special 
obligations and special relations to all “others”-past, present and future, near and far--into the 
policy decision mix.  
Ross’ system is consequence-sensitive and circumstance-dependent but it places emphasis 
on the duties inherent in preserving the moral order. The decision arises out of the facts and 
thus empirical conditions are the focus of the assessment. However, the decision must be 
grounded in the duties of non-harm, justice, fidelity, beneficence and reparation. 
Recognizing that circumstances change, Ross acknowledged that moral priorities might also 
change thereby providing the flexibility and discretion that decision makers insist on. 
However, discretion remains bounded and contained. 
Viewing the responsibilities of the Fed systematically in terms of Ross’s framework would 
help ensure a continual focus on the moral status of “others” as units of concern, and prevent 
the Fed from overlooking the elephant in the room and the consequences of its policies on 
real people. 
This framework certainly does not make the work of the Fed simpler, but again, referencing 
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Ross, ‘it is more important that a theory fit the facts than that it be simple.’ Dealing with the 
facts of the world  is the moral burden of a globally dominant institution like the Fed, and the 
reciprocal moral responsibility of the privilege it enjoys as the hegemonic reserve currency 
bank.  
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